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Abstract
Foreign relations specialists for the most part agree on this much: Medellin v. Texas may
prove to be the most important case in the field in recent memory—more than even the recent line
of Guantanamo decisions, significant as the general public assumes these to be. Agreement fades,
however, concerning exactly what Medellin’s importance will be. Does it signal a reversal of the
doctrine that treaties are presumptively self-executing? Or does it (merely) suggest hostility toward
domestic application of multi-lateral agreements, especially when they confer individual rights?
Is the Court’s opinion driven by a salutary commitment to domestic democratic process in the face
of elitist international institutions? Or does it reflect a cynical repudiation of text, history, and
structure in the service of statist conservatism? Or both? (P) In the race to suggest less obvious
reasons why Medellin may prove significant, this musing suggests two. Together they indicate
that the case’s legacy will likely be the undermining of a basic commitment to the rule of law,
both domestic and international. (P)First, Chief Justice Roberts’ analysis suggests that the type of
doctrinal disingenuousness that has seeped into the Court’s domestic jurisprudence has now arrived
in foreign relations. By this term I mean the Justices’ growing tendency to effect important shifts
in doctrine without clearly announcing what they are doing. This unfortunate technique, evident
in both conservative and liberal opinions, undermines rule of law values by yielding confusion
where the Court should be providing guidance. For just this reason, debates over the doctrinal
meaning of Medellin will persist until the Court gives a better idea of where it is heading. More
importantly, the failure to announce and define doctrinal shifts further undermines the rule of law
by allowing the Court to make ad hoc, inconsistent holdings given that enunciated doctrinal rules
no longer serve to constrain judicial decision making. (P) Second, Medellin weakens the rule of
law on a structural level through fundamentally misconceiving separation of powers, especially in
an increasingly globalized world. Here the problem is not simply the Chief Justice abandoning his
own ostensible commitment to constitutional text, history, structure, and case law, much as Justice
Breyer’s dissent points out. The real problem, rather, is doing all this to undermine perhaps the
chief function that the separation of powers exists to promote, namely, a balance among the main
departments of government the better to protect liberty. By holding the Vienna Convention as nonself-executing, the Court shirked its own express duty and so diminished its role in maintaining
this balance. Yet despite appearances, the ultimate beneficiary was not Congress but instead the
President. If one accepts that the Executive has become infinitely more powerful, the Court’s
action doubly undercuts separation of powers properly viewed. Add to the mix that globalization
has accelerated the comparative supremacy of the Executive still further, and the misstep is that
much greater.
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much: Medellin v. Texas' may prove to be the most important
case in the field in recent memory-more than even the recent
line of Guantanamo decisions, significant as the general public
assumes these to be. Agreement fades, however, concerning exactly what Medellin's importance will be. Does it signal a reversal
of the doctrine that treaties are presumptively self-executing?
Or does it (merely) suggest hostility toward domestic application
of multi-lateral agreements, especially when they confer individual rights? Is the Court's opinion driven by a salutary commitment to domestic democratic process in the face of elitist international institutions? Or does it reflect a cynical repudiation of
text, history, and structure in the service of statist conservatism?
Or both?
In the race to suggest less obvious reasons why Medellin may
prove significant, this musing suggests two. Together they indicate that the case's legacy will likely be the undermining of a
basic commitment to the rule of law, both domestic and international.
First, ChiefJustice Roberts' analysis suggests that the type of
doctrinal disingenuousness that has seeped into the Court's domestic jurisprudence has now arrived in foreign relations. By
this term I mean the Justices' growing tendency to effect important shifts in doctrine without clearly announcing what they are
doing. This unfortunate technique, evident in both conservative
and liberal opinions, undermines rule of law values by yielding
confusion where the Court should be providing guidance. For
just this reason, debates over the doctrinal meaning of Medellin
will persist until the Court gives a better idea of where it is heading. More importantly, the failure to announce and define doctrinal shifts further undermines the rule of law by allowing the
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Court to make ad hoc, inconsistent holdings given that enunciated doctrinal rules no longer serve to constrain judicial decision
making.
Second, Medellin weakens the rule of law on a structural
level through fundamentally misconceiving separation of powers, especially in an increasingly globalized world. Here the
problem is not simply the Chief Justice abandoning his own ostensible commitment to constitutional text, history, structure,
and case law, much as Justice Breyer's dissent points out.2 The
real problem, rather, is doing all this to undermine perhaps the
chief function that the separation of powers exists to promote,
namely, a balance among the main departments of government
the better to protect liberty. By holding the Vienna Convention
as non-self-executing, the Court shirked its own express duty and
so diminished its role in maintaining this balance. Yet despite
appearances, the ultimate beneficiary was not Congress but instead the President. If one accepts that the Executive has become infinitely more powerful, the Court's action doubly undercuts separation of powers properly viewed. Add to the mix that
globalization has accelerated the comparative supremacy of the
Executive still further, and the misstep is that much greater.
DOCTRINAL DISINGENUOUSNESS
Doctrinal disingenuousness refers to a technique in which
judges announce a significant shift in doctrine without fully acknowledging it, or even acknowledging it at all. Judges have various incentives to do this. Judging, especially in a common law
system, puts a premium on stability. If change is to take place, it
should be incremental, not radical. Beyond this, ajudge seeking
a major shift in doctrine may not infrequently face the choice of
having enough votes to obtain a certain result that reflects such
change, but not enough for an announcement adopting a new
doctrinal stance that may affect many more cases than more
hesitant colleagues may want to embrace.
Examples convey the technique better than description.
Whether the phenomenon has been ebbing or flowing could be
answered only by substantial research. An impressionist take,
however, suggests this judicial version of "hiding the ball" has
2. See generally id. at 1375-92 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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been recently on the rise, perhaps as a function of a closely divided Court. One area in which it has arisen is Equal Protection
jurisprudence, particularly in service of progressive results. Consider City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center.' There Justice
White refused to recognize mental challenge as a suspect or
quasi-suspect classification. The doctrinal result was application
of rational relationship review, which ordinarily means a rubber
stamp. The Court nonetheless invalidated the zoning measure
at issue, which at least gives rise to the inference that mental
challenge may actually trigger some de facto higher level of review, as was the case in gender with Reed v. Reed.4 Much the same
pattern can be seen in Romer v. Evans.5 There the Court dodged
the question of whether sexual orientation triggered higher
scrutiny. Yet again, rational relationship yielded invalidation of
nothing less than a state constitutional amendment ratified
through a referendum. Not for nothing did Justice Scalia see
the Court smuggling in a higher level of scrutiny while disclaiming doing anything of the sort.
Nor are more conservative majorities about doing this sort
of thing. In Equal Protection once more, the Court appeared to
settle a generation of contentiousness and declare that racebased affirmative action policies would trigger strict scrutiny. Yet
Justice O'Connor immediately muddied the waters by disclaiming the idea that strict scrutiny would not always be fatal in fact, a
suggestion apparently confirmed in Grutter v. Bollinger.6
One further example of doctrinal disingenuousness comes
from recent Commerce Clause cases. In United States v. Lopez,7
the Court for the first time in almost three generations famously
invalidated an Act of Congress as exceeding the Commerce
Power, yet all the while stressed that nothing doctrinally had
changed. United States v. Morrison' echoed both this result and
stance, though it did improve matters in one regard. There the
Court did enunciate that, before courts determine whether the
activity regulated substantially affects interstate commerce in the
aggregate, they must engage in the threshold inquiry as to what
3.
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was economic in nature. The majority averred that this inquiry
clearly emerged from prior decisions, a contestable reading at
best. That said, at the very least the Court did make clear that
Commerce Clause doctrine now included the prior inquiry.
By contrast, Medellin does not go even this far. Instead,
Chief Justice Roberts' approach more closely resembles Lopez
and the Equal Protection cases. In perfunctory fashion, the majority indicates that the case is no more than a straightforward
application of Foster v. Neilson9 and the doctrine that the intent
of the treaty-making parties may render treaties non-self-executing.1 ° It later more stridently declares its doctrinal conservatism
with regard to treaty interpretation, claiming it is engaging in
the tried-and-true methodology of looking to text, post-ratification action by other signatories, among other devices. 1
And yet, any number of the decision's moves cries out that a
significant, if not major, doctrinal shift is underway. To start at
the end, the judgment of course holds that the Avena judgment
is non-self-executing, which among other things precludes what
many saw as a cutting-edge opportunity for the Court to opine
on the constitutional limits of delegation "outward" to international adjudicatory institutions. This is not the place to rehearse
detailed arguments as to whether the Court's conclusion was
simply wrong. It is, however, to note that the conclusion was
hardly obvious. Moreover, as the dissent notes, the Court's textual and post-ratification analysis makes it hard to see how any
judgment of an international adjudicatory body may be self-executing in a multilateral agreement.
What truly suggests that a major doctrinal shift is afoot, however, are various hints, emphases, and gaps in the Court's reasoning. First, the Chief Justice does not discuss the one constitutional text on point, the Supremacy Clause, that if read in the
same way the majority reads the relevant treaties, would admit of
no non-self-executing treaties. Second, the Court's quasi-treatment of history is suspiciously thin. It gives no background as to
why the Founders adopted self-execution in the first place, or of
the enduring relevance of those reasons. Rather, the Court misleadingly cites The Federalist for the proposition that treaties are
9. 27 U.S. 253 (1829).
10. Medellin, 128 S. Ct. at 1356-57.
11. See generally id. at 1357-60.
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primarily compacts between nations, yet utterly ignoring their
dual feature as supreme law. 2 Third, Chief Justice Roberts simply ignores early practice, which indicates that the judiciary presumed treaties to be self-executing. Nor, fourthly and with due
respect to Messers. Bradley and Goldsmith, does the Court acknowledge that the "orthodox" position had been to presume
that treaties were self-executing absent indications otherwise?
Only time will tell whether Medellin does signify a major shift
masquerading as business as usual. But assuming this to be the
case, this exercise in doctrinal disingenuousness suggests certain
costs. Most obvious is simply confusion. Should judges, lawyers,
and academics take their cues from the Court's protestations of
continuity? Or should the presumption now be that treaties, especially multilateral human rights treaties, are non-self-executing even without the usual Senate declaration to that effect? Second, doctrinal confusion of this sort tends to empower the judiciary, even when, as here, it undermines doctrines that would
ordinarily accord it a greater role. This point follows simply because vague doctrine affords judges to pick and choose what results they desire. Yet most important, and related, is the idea
that the judiciary's failure to limit its own discretion is fundamentally at odds with most conceptions of the rule of law. A
clear, and traditional, presumptive rule as to self-execution
would at least channel the discretion of those charged with applying those treaties in all three branches. So too would a contrary rule. A doctrinal position that purports to be one thing, yet
at the same time undermines the very position it is meant to further, begins to lose its claim to law at all. Instead, what results is
an ad hoc, case-by-case, exercise in policy-making, at least until
the rule later, if ever, becomes settled.
Until that point, only one group emerges as clear winners.
These are, of course, academics who will reap the benefits of
conferences, publications, op-eds, and speaking engagements
opining on the meaning of the latest set of tea leaves from the
Marble Palace.
SEPARATION OF POWERS
Medellin also undermines the rule of law substantively. The
Court does this largely offstage, with the assumptions it makes
12. See id. at 1357.
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concerning separation of powers. In this regard, many commentators will surely assert that the decision represents an abdication
of judicial responsibility. Text, history, structure, and early practice all point toward a fairly strong presumption of treaty selfexecution. On this assumption, the Court's judgment hands
over domestically justiciable law to the political discretion of
Congress. This argument will strike many as compelling as far as
it goes. Medellin's approach to separation of powers nonetheless
misfires in a more profound way. The Court has not merely
failed to discharge its specified duty of applying treaties as the
supreme law of the land. Medellin further violates separation of
powers at a more general, functional, and important level. Specifically, the decision: 1) undermines balance among the
branches, an essential separation of powers function; 2) by empowering in the end the executive, already the most powerful
branch; which 3) will likely get even stronger as a function of
globalization.
Consider first separation of powers at its most fundamental
level. The Constitution generally treats the division of authority
in functional, rather than categorical or specific, terms. There is
simply little or no evidence that the Founders widely agreed on
whether various specific powers, such as removal or treaty termination, were essentially legislative, executive, or judicial outside
the core meaning of those terms. By partial contrast, the Constitution does specifically allocate numerous powers among the
branches, sometimes in unprecedented ways. One such is judicial application of treaties as self-executing law, which creates
the more specific problem for the Medellin majority. That said,
text, history, and structure leaves a substantial number of specific issues unresolved. Here, the best that can be said is that
separation of powers clearly promotes certain general functions,
against which modern controversies should be weighed. Of
these, by far the most important-at least as far as the Founders
were concerned-was the maintenance of a balance of power
among the branches to prevent a tyrannical accretion of authority in any one branch.
Medellin fails from a functionalist standpoint. Here the key
question is whether fashioning a doctrine that takes domestic application of treaties from the judiciary advances or retards bal-
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ance among the branches. Bush v. Gore13 notwithstanding, one
would be hard pressed to argue that the judiciary wields so much
power, at least in foreign affairs, that its authority needs to be
reigned in. Yet the same observation could be made about Congress, the branch which at first blush appears to be the principal
recipient of the power the judiciary is giving away. Under a
strong self-execution regime, courts would apply treaties; under
a weakened version, the decision to have treaties apply domestically in the first place would fall to Congress. On the assumption
that Congress, in areas such as war and treaty termination, is not
itself an overly powerful branch either, the most that could be
said in functionalist terms is that one weak branch has accorded
another weak branch an important power.
Further consideration, however, suggests a different beneficiary and a different conclusion. As a practical matter, movement from a doctrine of strong to weak self-execution will ultimately benefit not Congress but the President. If for no other
reason than the press of business, it is unlikely that Congress
would incorporate, or perhaps even consider incorporating, a
substantial number of treaties into domestic law, even where
there may be widespread support for doing so. By default, authority to apply treaties would fall to the executive in at least two
ways. First, the President would have substantial control over
whether a treaty might be incorporated or not by having the initiative to propose doing so or not. Second, at least in a regime
of weak self-execution, an executive decision to treat a treaty as
self-executing (or not), would create its own presumption. This
is especially true where, as in Medellin, the Court employs the
rhetoric of deference to executive treaty-interpretation.
At this point, the only remaining step in a functionalist analysis centers on considering the relative power of the President to
the other branches, especially in the foreign affairs context. To
this question, suffice it to say that the observations Justice Jackson made about the threat of an overbearing executive, especially in foreign affairs, appear to be truer today than they were
in 1952.14
The one critical additional consideration would be a devel13. 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
14. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579. 634 (1952) (Jackson,J,
concurring).
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opment that Justice Jackson, for all his reliance on comparative
law, did not foresee. As Anne-Marie Slaughter among others has
pointed out, globalization has eroded state sovereignty insofar as
government actors deal more and more with their counterparts
in other nations. Where states dealt with each other as states,
today, legislators from one country visit, share information, and
coordinate with one another, as do judges, as do especially executive officials and regulators.1 5 What Slaughter does not ask is
what the net effect of this form of inter-governmental globalization is in separation of powers terms in any one country. The
evidence she adduces, however, strongly suggests that the net
beneficiary in any state is the executive branch. Much work
needs to be done to demonstrate the thesis that separation of
powers in a global context reveals comparatively stronger executive branches. On this assumption, however, it follows that Medellin is doubly ill-considered. From a functionalist perspective,
it is bad enough the decision shifts power from the courts to the
"most dangerous branch" on standard analysis. The decision is
that much worse when considering the additional imbalance
that globalization promises.
CODA
Much commentary on Medellin will no doubt focus on aspects that fall between the two features considered here. The
battle over text, history, and structure waged between the majority and dissent should rightly frame the ongoing debate. That
said, the Court's treatment of doctrine on the micro level, and
its unconcern for the implications of its decision from a functionalist separation of powers standpoint on the macro plane,
raise troubling issues in their own right.
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